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Abstract
Adversarial examples are carefully perturbed in-
puts for fooling machine learning models. A well-
acknowledged defense method against such exam-
ples is adversarial training, where adversarial ex-
amples are injected into training data to increase
robustness. In this paper, we propose a new at-
tack to unveal an undesired property of the state-
of-the-art adversarial training, that is it fails to
obtain robustness against perturbations in `2 and
`∞ norms simultaneously. We discuss a possible
solution to this issue and its limitations as well.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved significant
success when applied to a variety of challenging machine-
learning tasks. For example, DNNs have obtained state-
of-the-art accuracy on large-scale image classification (He
et al., 2016b; ?). At the same time, vulnerability to adver-
sarial examples, an undesired property of DNNs, has drawn
attention in the deep-learning community (Szegedy et al.,
2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014). Generally speaking, adver-
sarial examples are perturbed versions of the original data
that successfully fool a classifier. For example, in the image
domain, adversarial examples are images transformed from
natural images with visually negligible changes but that
lead to wrong predictions (Goodfellow et al., 2014). The
existence of adversarial examples has raised many concerns,
especially in scenarios with a high risk of misclassification,
such as autonomous driving.
To tackle adversarial examples, a variety of defensive meth-
ods against adversarial attacks have been proposed, yet most
of them remain vulnerable to adaptive attacks (Szegedy
et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2016; Car-
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lini & Wagner, 2017; Brendel et al., 2017; Athalye et al.,
2018). One type of adversarial defense that demonstrated
good performance against strong attacks is based on adver-
sarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Madry et al., 2017;
Zhang et al., 2019). Adversarial training constructs a de-
fense model by augmenting the training set with adversarial
examples. Though this is a simple strategy, it has achieved
a great success in adversarial defense.
The strength of attacks are commonly quantified by the `p
distance between adversarial examples and natural examples.
One desired property of a defense model is norm-agnostic,
which requires a model to be robust against attacks con-
strained by a variety of norms. Recently, a more general
attack mechanism called unrestricted adversarial attacks
are introduced by Brown et al. (2018), where adversarial
examples are not necessarily close to a natural image as
long as they are semantically similar. To achieve robust-
ness against unrestricted attacks, being norm-agnostic is a
minimum requirement.
In this paper, we propose a new attack method and show
adversarial training, the most successful adversarial defense
models, is not norm-agnostic. Previously, it was reported
both in (Madry et al., 2017) and (Zhang et al., 2019) that
`∞ adversarial training is robust against `2 attacks. Our
experiments, however, suggest they fail to defend against `2
and `∞ adversarial examples simultaneously.
2. Background and Related Work
Adversarial training constructs adversarial examples that are
included to the training set to train a new and more robust
classifier. This method is intuitive and has gained great
success in defense (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Madry et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2019). Madry et al.
(2017) showed that iterative attacks during training yield
strong defense models to while-box attacks (Athalye et al.,
2018). More recently, another adversarial training based
defense model (Zhang et al., 2019) has won the first place
in the defense track of the NIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision
Challenge (Brendel et al., 2018).
Although adversarial training has been so far one of the
most successful defense methods, it has its limitations. In
(Trame`r et al., 2017), it was pointed out that single-step
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adversarial training, where single-step method (e.g., FGSM
(Goodfellow et al., 2014)) is used for constructing adversar-
ial examples, suffers from the “degenerate global minimum”
issue and thus is not robust. To mitigate this issue, they
propose ensemble adversarial training to improve the gener-
alization of adversarial training. More recently, (Song et al.,
2018) suggests using domain adaption as an improvement of
ensemble adversarial training, leading to better robustness.
However, both works only focus on single-step attack based
adversarial training, while the most advanced adversarial
training models are based on multi-step attacks. Trame`r
et al. (2017) states that incorporating multi-step attacks dur-
ing training could fix the degenerate-global-minimum issue.
In this paper, we show multi-step adversarial training still
suffers from this issue.
3. Preliminary
3.1. Adversarial Examples
Given a classifier f : X → {1, . . . , k} for an image x ∈ X ,
an adversarial example xadv satisfies D(x,xadv) <  for
some small  > 0, and f(x) 6= f(xadv), where D(·, ·) is
some distance metric, i.e., xadv is close to x but yields a
different classification result. The distance is often described
in terms of an `p metric, and in most of the literature `2 and
`∞ metrics are considered.
One of the simplest and widely used attack methods is a
single-step method, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
(Kurakin et al., 2016), which manipulates inputs along the
direction of the gradient with respect to the outputs:
xadv = Πx+S(x+ α(∇xL(θ,x, y)) (1)
where Πx+S is the projection operation that ensures adver-
sarial examples stay in the `p ball S around x.
Its multi-step variant FGSMk is more powerful and has been
shown to be equivalent to exploring adversarial examples
with the projected gradient descent (PGD) method (Madry
et al., 2017):
xt+1adv = Πx+S(x
t
adv + α(∇xL(θ,x, y)) (2)
3.2. Adversarial Training
The motivation behind adversarial training is that finding a
robust model against adversarial examples is equivalent to
solving the saddle-point problem:
min
θ
max
x′:D(x,x′)<
L(θ,x′, y)
The inner maximization is equivalent to constructing ad-
versarial examples, while the outer minimization can be
performed by standard training procedure for loss minimiza-
tion.
Therefore, to achieve robustness to adversarial examples, ad-
versarial training augments the training data with adversarial
examples constructed during training, as an approximation
to the inner maximization procedure.
Recently, Zhang et al. (2019) suggested using L(θ,x, y) =
L(fθ(x), y) + λL(fθ(x), fθ(xadv)) as the training loss, in-
stead of L(fθ(x), y) and L(fθ(xadv), y) alternatively used
in (Madry et al., 2017).
3.3. Degenerate Global Minimum
In (Trame`r et al., 2017), it is pointed out that if xadv denotes
the adversarial example generated by FGSM, adversarial
training ideally results in a robust classification model θ∗
such that:
L(θ∗,xadv, y) ≈ max
x′:D(x,x′)<
L(θ∗,x′, y) ≈ 0
However, the training procedure may instead discover a
“degenerate global minimum” θ∗:
L(θ∗,xadv, y) max
x′:D(x,x′)<
L(θ∗,x′, y)
In another word, the training procedure may generate a
model that makes finding adversarial examples difficult for
FGSM instead of a truly robust model.
(Trame`r et al., 2017) proposes two possible solutions for
mitigating this issue. One is to use a strong multi-step ad-
versarial training, such as PGD, at a cost of increased com-
putational burden. Another is ensemble adversarial training,
that is incorporating adversarial examples generated from
multiple pre-trained classifiers that are different from the
original one. In this way, they can decouple the construction
of adversarial examples and the training to prevent “degen-
erate global minimum”, while still obtain the robustness of
adversarial training due to the transferability of adversarial
perturbations across models (Goodfellow et al., 2014).
4. Second Order Attack
We propose a new attack motivated by the “degenerate
global minimum”. Note adversarial training is equivalent to
solving the optimization problem:
(θˆ, xˆ) = argmin
θ
argmax
x′:D(x,x′)<
L(θ,x′, y).
Its solution is a saddle point of L, i.e., the gradient ideally
vanishes at xˆ as∇xL(θˆ,x, y)|xˆ = 0. In practice, an adver-
sarial training often finds θˆ that makes the loss function flat
in the neighborhood of a natural example x, which leads to
inefficient exploration for adversarial examples when per-
forming attacks. This is intuitively the cause of “degenerate
global minimum”.
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Table 1. Accuracy of Various Adversarial Training Strategies against Various Attacks
Madry’s TRADES Ensemble ATDA
Attacks `2 `∞ Mix `2 `∞ Mix `2 `∞ Mix `2 `∞ Mix
Natural 98.2% 98.8% 98.7% 99.4% 99.5% 99.4% 99.4% 99.0% 98.7% 99.2% 98.8% 99.0%
PGD (`2) 97.0% 92.8% 73.2% 91.7% 91.7% 90.4% 99.0% 65.3% 58.2% 98.8% 63.6% 57.9%
PGD (`∞) 0.4% 92.5% 82.2% 19.7% 95.6% 15.3% 0.0% 90.2% 81.4% 0.0% 62.6% 81.3%
S-O (`2) 96.6% 0.0% 18.3% 81.7% 3.2% 84.2% 98.9% 65.8% 58.4% 97.2% 64.0% 56.8%
S-O (`∞) 0.0% 91.3% 84.2% 16.9% 94.7% 14.5% 0.0% 88.9% 82.1% 0.0% 61.3% 83.4%
Most current attack methods construct adversarial examples
based on the gradient of a loss function. However, according
to the analysis above, first-order derivative is not effective
for attacks if the defense model is trained adversarially. This
motivates utilization of the second-order derivative of a loss
function to construct adversarial examples.
To this end, assume the loss function is twice differentiable
with respect to x. Using Taylor expansion on the difference
between the losses on the original and perturbed samples,
and assuming the gradient vanishes, we have
L(θ,x+ r, y)− L(θ,x, y) ≈ 1
2
rTH(θ,x, y)r
with r being the perturbation, and H(θ,x, y) is the Hessian
matrix of the loss function. Our goal is to find a small per-
turbation r that maximizes the difference L(θ,x+ r, y)−
L(θ,x, y). Our idea is based on the observation that the op-
timal perturbation direction should be in the same direction
as the first dominant eigenvector, e(θ,x, y), of H(θ,x, y),
that is r =  e(θ,x,y)‖e(θ,x,y)‖2 for some constant  > 0. However,
computing the eigenvectors of the Hessian matrix requires
O(I3) runtime with I the dimension of the data. To tackle
this issue, we adopt the fast approximation method from
(Miyato et al., 2017), which is essentially a combination of
the power-iteration method and the finite-difference method,
to efficiently find the direction of the eigenvector. Based on
this method, the optimal direction, denoted radv , is approxi-
mated∗ by
radv =
g
‖g‖2 , with g = ∇xL(θ,x, y)|x+ξd (3)
where d is a randomly sampled unit vector and ξ > 0 is a
manually chosen step size. In practice, d is drawn from a
centered Gaussian distribution and normalized such that its
`2 norm is 1.
This procedure is essentially a stochastic approximation to
the optimal second-order direction, where the randomness
comes from d. To reduce the variance of the approximation,
we further take the expectation over the Gaussian noise,
yielding g = Ed∼N(0,σ2I) [∇xL(θ,x, y)|x+d]. Note that
choosing σ is equivalent to choosing the step size ξ in (3).
∗Detailed derivations are provided in the Supplementary Mate-
rial.
Finally, we construct adversarial examples by an iterative
update via PGD:
xt+1 = Πx+S(xt + αradv) = Πx+S(xt + α
gt
‖gt‖2 ) (4)
where gt = Ed∼N(0,σ2I) [∇xL(θ,x, y)|x+d]. Intuitively,
this method perturbs the example at each iteration and tries
to move out of the local maximum in the sample space, due
to the introduction of random Gaussian noise.
5. Experiments
We perform experiments on the MNIST data set to validate
our claims on adversarial training.
The architecture of our model follows the ones used in
(Madry et al., 2017). Specifically, the model contains two
convolutional layers with 32 and 64 filters, each followed
by 2× 2 max-pooling, and a fully connected layer of size
1024. Image intensities are scaled to [0, 1], and the size of
attacks are also rescaled accordingly. In all the experiments,
we bound the `2 norm less than 4.0 while the `∞ norm less
than 0.3.
We evaluate PGD and proposed S-O attacks on four set-
tings: adversarial training with PGD adversarial examples
(Madry et al., 2017), Tradeoff-inspired Adversarial Defense
(TRADES) (Zhang et al., 2019), ensemble adversarial train-
ing (Trame`r et al., 2017), adversarial training via domain
adaption(Song et al., 2018).
Specifically, we first consider constructing adversarial ex-
amples with `2 and `∞ constraints during training respec-
tively. Table 1 shows, as expected, that Madry’s model and
TRADES successfully defend attacks with the same norm
constraints. However, in spite of the fact that `∞ adversarial
training stays robust against `2 PGD attack, S-O attack can
effectively reduce the accuracy of both models when a dif-
ferent norm is used. This suggests that standard adversarial
training is not norm-agnostic.
It is natural to wonder whether the issue will be fixed if
two kinds of adversarial examples are both included during
training. To this end, we conduct additional experiments
with mixed adversarial examples, that is alternating between
`2 and `∞ bounded examples for adversarial training. Using
the mixed strategy, the accuracy on both attacks are no
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longer reduced to almost zero, but the overall performance
is still unsatisfying. We conclude that mixing adversarial
examples barely helps improving norm-agnostic robustness.
According to our analysis, the poor performance of adver-
sarial training is due to “degenerate global minimum”, there-
fore, we expect ensemble adversarial training could fix the
problem, as suggested in (Trame`r et al., 2017). The re-
sults from Table 1 suggest ensemble adversarial training
and domain adaption partially fixes the issue, although the
accuracy against `2 attacks is still far from ideal.
In addition, we found two more interest phenomenons that
can support our claims. Firstly, the relatively good perfor-
mance of ensemble adversarial training implies that the vul-
nerability to adversarial perturbations with different norms
is indeed caused by the “degenerate global minimum” issue,
similar to the single-step adversarial training. Secondly, the
performance of PGD and S-O attacks become similar for
ensemble adversarial training model. This implies the effec-
tiveness of S-O attacks compared to PGD attacks is due to
exploitation of the “degenerate global minimum” issue.
In figure 1, we take a closer look at the behaviour of the
attack methods by plotting the average `2 norms of the gra-
dients of the loss function with respect to the adversarial ex-
amples during the construction processes. Specifically, we
compute 1Nbatch
∑
i∈I ‖∇xL(θ,x, y)|x(t)i ‖2 for each t, where
I is the index set of a batch.
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Figure 1. S-O attack Left: Average `2 norm of the gradients of
the loss function for a batch in each iteration during adversarial
attack. Blue: Naturally trained model attacked by PGD. Orange:
TRADES attacked by PGD. Green: TRADES attacked by S-O.
We monitor this quantity for three settings: naturally trained
model attacked by PGD, TRADES attacked by PGD, and
TRADES attacked by S-O. The difference between the blue
and orange lines show the `2 norms of the gradients of the
adversarially trained model are much smaller than the ones
of the naturally trained model under PGD attacks, validating
our explanation in Section 4, that an adversarially trained
model tends to make the loss function “flat” in the neigh-
borhood of natural examples which makes PGD attacks
inefficient. The difference between the orange and green
lines shows S-O attack is able to construct adversarial ex-
amples more efficiently by correctly finding the steepest
direction, which explains why adversarially trained models
are vulnerable to it.
Finally, one may argue that the perturbation size `2 = 4.0
is too large that it violates the assumption that adversarial
perturbations are visually negligible. We therefore perform
S-O attack with perturbation size `2 ≤ 2.0, which results
in accuracy 41.04%. We also illustrate some randomly se-
lected perturbed adversarial examples that are misclassified
by TRADES in figure 2.
Figure 2. Above: Natural examples from MNIST. The correct
labels are 2,1,7,7,1,3. Below: Adversarial examples with pertur-
bation size `2 ≤ 2.0. The adversarially trained model predictions
are 0,4,9,2,4,8.
One can observe that although noticeable, there are only a
limited amount of perturbations in the adversarial examples
that do not change the semantic meaning of the images.
CIFAR-10 It is worth-noting that we do not observe sim-
ilar results on CIFAR-10. We believe on CIFAR-10, it is
difficult to reach even a “degenerate global minimum” for
adversarial training due to the high dimensionality of the
input space. This explains why adversarial training is still
far from being perfectly robust even against PGD (Madry
et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2019).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we show multi-step adversarial training mod-
els suffer from “degenerate global minimum” and thus are
not norm-agnostic robust. Our proposed attack method is
capable of constructing adversarial examples that reduces
the accuracy of state-of-the-art adversarial training when
different norms are used for training and attacking.
On the other hand, ensemble adversarial training can miti-
gate the issue thus should be considered as a standard pro-
cedure for adversarial training, even though they can only
obtain moderate adversarial robustness.
In general, considering state-of-the-art results in adversarial
defense are often achieved by adversarial training, we be-
lieve it is important to check the norm-agnostic robustness
when designing adversarial defense models.
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A. Fast Approximate Method (Miyato et al.,
2017)
Power iteration method (?) allows one to compute the dom-
inant eigenvector r of a matrix H. Let d0 be a randomly
sampled unit vector which is not perpendicular to r, the
iterative calculation of
dt+1 =
Hdt
‖Hdt‖2
leads to dt → r. Given H is the Hessian matrix of
L(θ,x, y), we further use finite difference method to re-
duce the computational complexity:
Hd ≈ ∇x+ξdL(θ,x+ ξd, y)−∇xL(θ,x, y)
ξ
=
∇x+ξdL(θ,x+ ξd, y)
ξ
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where ξ > 0 is the step size. If we only take one iteration,
it gives an approximation that only requires the first-order
derivative:
r ≈ Hd‖Hdt‖2
≈ ∇x+ξdL(θ,x+ ξd, y)‖∇x+ξdL(θ,x+ ξd, y)‖
which gives equation 3.
